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I'd first like to congratulate those who had the vision and determination to bring us together, 
for one can see that this is quite a relevant and pertinent issue. And I'm sure that the organizers did 
not know that the conference would be held the same day that David Duke was up for election in 
the state where my mother and father were born-old Jim and Jane Crow Louisiana. Nor did they 
know that it would be the day after Michael Jackson decided to make his statement about identity-
black or white-in a video. But I think this matter raises three fundamental questions that I want to 
zoom in on very quickly. The first is "What do we mean by 'identity'?" Since this term itself can be a 
rather elusive, amorphous, and even vaporous one, we need to have heuristic markings for it. The 
second is "What is the moral content of one's identities?"-because we all have multiple positions in 
terms of constructing our identities; there's no such thing as having one identity or of there being 
one essential identity that fundamentally defines who we actually are. And third, "What are the 
political consequences of our various identities?"-which is what Joan Scott was talking about with 
such insight.  
So let's begin with a heuristic definition. For me identity is fundamentally about desire and 
death. How you construct your identity is predicated on how you construct desire and how you 
conceive of death: desire for recognition; quest for visibility (Baldwin-no name in the street; nobody 
knows my name); the sense of being acknowledged; a deep desire for association-what Edward Said 
would call affiliation. It's the longing to belong, a deep, visceral need that most linguistically 
conscious animals who transact with an environment (that's us) participate in. And then there is a 
profound desire for protection, for security, for safety, for surety. And so in talking about identity we 
have to begin to look at the various ways in which human beings have constructed their desire for 
recognition, association, and protection over time and in space and always under circumstances not 
of their own choosing. But identity also has to do with death. We can't talk about identity without 
talking about death. That's what a brother named Julio Rivera had to come to terms with: the fact 
that his identity had been constructed in such a way that xenophobes would put him to death. Or 
brother Youssef Hawkins in Bensonhurst. Or brother Yankel Rosenbaum in Crown Heights. 
Persons who construct their identities and desires often do it in such a way that they're willing to die 
for it-soldiers in the Middle East, for example-or, under a national identity, that they're willing to 
kill others. And the rampant sexual violence in the lives of thousands of women who are attacked by 
men caught up in vicious patriarchal identities-this speaks to what we're talking about. But if in fact 
identity has something to do with these various kinds of desires, these various conceptions of death 
(we are beings-toward-death), it's because we have, given our inevitable extinction, to come up with 
a way of endowing ourselves with significance.  
So we'll weave webs of existential meaning. We'll say something about the terrors of nature, 
the cruelties of fate, the unjustifiability of suffering. It sounds very much like religion. But let's 
understand: religion not in the theological sense, but in the etymological sense of ligare, which 
means to bind. Identity is about binding, and it means, on the one hand, that you can be bound- 
parochialist, narrow, xenophobic. But it also means that you can be held together in the face of the 
terrors of nature, the cruelties of fate, and the need for some compensation for unjustified suffering: 
what theologians used to call the problem of evil. And believe me, identity cuts at that deep 
existential level where religion resides. That's what's frightening, especially for the left that, like 
Habermas, has linked itself to an Enlightenment bandwagon. For it's a shaking of the rationalist 
foundation.  
But keep in mind, here, the crucial interplay between desire and death, the quest for 
existential meaning and material resources. For identity is about bodies, land, labor, and instruments 
of production. It's about the distribution of resources. That's, in part, what David Duke is all about. 
He's addressing a background condition of the maldistribution of resources in which downward 
mobility is forcing a working class, squeezed by taxes and exploited by a ruling group, to race-bait 
and scapegoat black folk, Jewish people, and women. So we must always keep in mind the role of 
material resources and the various systems that generate their distribution and consumption. There 
has to be a dialectical interplay in talking about these things; and of course that's one of the 
problems of a narrow and xenophobic identity politics or political positions. Such positions cause us 
to lose sight of the fact that we linguistically conscious animals have, up to this moment, had to 
labor under a radically inegalitarian distribution of resources.  
And we thus come to our second question: "What is the moral content of your identity?" It's 
another way of raising the question of how radically democratic are you when you talk about 
defining your identity, especially in relation to this maldistribution of resources. If this is important, 
it's because one of the most disturbing things about identity talk-especially in America, but my 
hunch is it's true around the world-is that when people speak about identity, they always begin by 
talking about the victims. Having a conference on race? Bring on the black folk. We don't want to 
invite some white racists so they can lay bare the internal dynamics of what it is to be a white racist. 
No. Having a conference on gender? Bring on women. As if whiteness is not as fundamentally 
constructed within the discourse of race as blackness is. As if maleness is not as fundamentally 
structured in the discourse of gender as is femaleness, or woman. As if straightness were inscribed 
into the nature of things, and those who are not straight have to provide some account of their 
identity. No, let's talk about identity-from-above as well as identity-from-below. That's something 
that is rarely stressed, rarely examined, rarely specified. We need to get a handle on how this 
whiteness, maleness, and straightness functions over time and space in relation to blackness or 
brownness or yellowness or womanness or gayness or lesbianness, etc.  
I would hope that in our studies as well as in our discussions we recognize the very different 
status-the different political status-between identity from above and from below. I think this has 
much to do with the degree to which, when we talk about identities, we rarely speak of some of the 
larger identities that shape us. For example, national identity-which is very different from having a 
nation-state-is one of the most powerful means of constructing desire and death in our present 
moment. It functions on a different axis from that of race or gender, but with dialectic affinities. 
Why? Because there are racialized subjects who are deeply linked to national identity. That's one of 
the fascinating things about black neoconservatives: they're against identity (they're thinking about 
black identity), but they are also the most rampant American nationalists in the country. The same 
thing would be true on other axes as well.  
Thus addressing the moral content of one's identity forces us to raise the question of what 
and where the radical democratic project is. To what degree is that project called into question by 
certain narrow forms of identity politics? And what social basis could there be for a radical 
democratic project? I'm not going to answer that, but I'm raising the question. I think this is 
something that we have to grapple and come to terms with. 
But I want to end by saying something about the last question, the one about the political 
consequences of one's identities. Since this has to do with strategies and tactics, it is something the 
left rarely talks about. Intellectuals usually have little to say about this. How do you go about 
binding people? What is the political version of the ligare activity, which is to say, mobilizing and 
organizing? Although at this present moment, one cannot, must not, give up on the radical 
democratic project, yet we find ourselves up against a wall in trying to put forward effective ways of 
mobilizing and organizing. Yes, the left is Balkanized; yes, the left is fragmented. The older univer- 
salist projects of the left have been shattered-shattered in part because they did not speak effectively 
to desire and death: they are an Enlightenment project whose critical acumen we must preserve but 
whose glib pseudouniversalisms we must radically call into question. As long as we simply hide 
various particularisms, but without that critical acumen, there cannot be a radical democratic 
project. So there must be strategies and tactics that cut across identity politics, cut across region, and 
gender, race, and class. Class is still around even though it's been unable to constitute an identity 
that has the saliency and potency of the other identities. And we must attempt to think about how 
we create and sustain organizations that acknowledge this. Because we're in the bind we're in partly 
because we've been unable to generate the transgendered, transracial, transsexual orientation of social 
motion, social momentum, social movement. And if we can't do that, then there will be many, many 
more David Dukes by the end of the twentieth century, even while we engage in our chatter about 
identity.  
So we have a crucial organizational, strategic, and tactical imperative. It's not that we have to 
have an organizational meeting, but we have to engage the question of mobilization as an object of 
reflection, because as Joan Scott said, politics and thinking go hand and hand. And while our politics 
are understood in a multidimensional and multilayered way it is also true that, on the ground, 
without the kind of social motion, momentum, and movement that I'm talking about, we'll feel 
ourselves more and more pushed against the wall as the xenophobes-be it the Lombard League in 
Italy, or the skinheads in Germany, or Le Pen in France-more and more speak their right-wing 
constructs of desire and death to mobilize and organize their populace.  
And that's serious business. When you get working-class folk, lower middle-class folk in 
Louisiana saying that what they see reminds them of Germany in 1930, that's not a plaything. And 
of course black folk know that by experience. That is a serious challenge. 
